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This article explores an aspect of identity that can be particularly 
challenging for conflict resolution—negative identity. By negative identity, I 
mean an identity in which a party implicitly or explicitly defines itself in a 
negative way, specifically, by way of contrast to some other party. This 
phenomenon occurs in conflicts ranging from small, interpersonal ones to 
large-scale conflicts between national, ethnic, and religious groups. Negative 
identities may make conflicts more likely to arise and also make them more 
difficult to resolve when they do. Fortunately, there are steps that both parties 
and neutrals can take to foster conflict resolution in the context of negative 
identity. These include processes that help parties listen to one another with 
open minds, engage in self-examination of their own identities, and embrace 
the range of identities that they hold. 
  






There can be little doubt that identity is a factor in many conflicts. In 
broad conflicts between members of different national, ethnic, and religious 
groups, this is an all-too-common pattern. As Amartya Sen observes, “The 
cultivated violence associated with identity conflicts seems to repeat itself 
around the world with increasing persistence.”1 Identity is also a core element 
of many microscopic conflicts. Douglas Stone, Bruce Patton, and Sheila Heen 
have argued that beneath our most difficult conversations with others often 
lies an internal wrestling with ourselves.2 Here, I examine a special feature of 
identity that is particularly challenging for conflict resolution. I call this feature 
“negative identity.” By negative identity, I mean the situation where one party 
implicitly or explicitly defines itself by way of contrast to the other party. What 
does it mean to be a Democrat? For some, it means in essence to be against 
the Republicans rather than for certain policies. What does it mean to be an 
American? For some, it means to be opposed to “illegal aliens” rather than, 
say, in favor of a free society. Sometimes negative identities define parties 
fully, and sometimes they only do so in part. In either case, when negative 
identities are present, the challenges for conflict resolution are acute. Negative 
identities may increase the chances of conflicts arising. When conflicts do 
arise, negative identities may also make those conflicts harder to resolve, for 
in addition to the many ordinary barriers to conflict resolution, 3 parties may 
be required to rethink their very sense of self.  
This paper works in four stages. First, I begin by defining negative 
identity. Second, I examine why negative identities may make conflicts more 
likely to arise and why conflicts involving parties with negative identities may 
be particularly difficult to resolve. Third, I suggest several approaches to 
fostering conflict resolution when parties hold negative identities. Fourth, I 
offer a famous literary example, the biblical narrative of Jacob and Esau, to 
illustrate the concept of negative identity and the value of identity redefinition 
to conflict resolution. I end with several concluding observations. 
 
II. NEGATIVE IDENTITY 
 
Identity is a complex phenomenon. Most of us hold not one identity 
but many. I, for example, am a human, a man, a parent, a son, a spouse, a 
 
1 AMARTYA SEN, IDENTITY AND VIOLENCE: THE ILLUSION OF DESTINY 3 (2006). 
2 DOUGLAS STONE ET AL., DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS: HOW TO DISCUSS WHAT 
MATTERS MOST 111–28 (1999). 
3 See KENNETH ARROW ET AL., BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (1995) (on 
common barriers to resolving conflicts). 




professor, an American, a Jew, a vegetarian, a Red Sox fan, and a music lover 
. . . and this is only a partial list. Different identities may become salient 
depending on the time and context. It may not matter much that I am a parent 
when I enter a classroom to teach law students, but it may matter a great deal 
on one of my children’s birthdays. Some identities are inherited or externally 
imposed (e.g., by being born in the United States, I became an American), and 
some identities we obtain through our actions (e.g., I became a spouse when I 
got married).4 Some identities are deeply embedded while others are more 
malleable. It would be much easier for me to give up being a Red Sox fan than 
to cease being a vegetarian. Note, too, that identities are not static over the 
course of our lives. We can reason about what it means to hold a particular 
identity (e.g., what does it mean for me to be a son now that my father is 
deceased?) or even whether we wish to hold certain identities. Indeed, 
choosing who we are to be is one of the deepest human freedoms,5 a freedom 
many of us fail to exercise as often as we might. So, too, choosing which 
identities shall guide us when is an important responsibility. From a conflict 
resolution perspective, such choice of identity is especially important. As 
Amartya Sen rightly describes, far too much violence exists in our world 
because people reduce the complexity of who they are and who others are to 
single variables.6 We mistakenly believe unitary identities must lead to certain 
destinies (e.g., “We must be in conflict because I am a member of group X and 
you are a member of group Y.”) and too often sidestep the deep challenge of 
wrestling with the complexities of who we are and who we might be. 
What is negative identity? Negative identity occurs when a person or 
group defines themselves by way of contrast to others, either implicitly or 
explicitly.7 What does it mean to be a member of religion X? For some, it 
 
4 Externally-imposed identities can create distinct challenges, especially in the context 
of group conflict, for groups, particularly socially-dominant groups, may be invested in 
preserving such identities as an aspect of preserving social power. On challenges to 
navigating identity issues in such contexts, see, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, 
Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000) (examining identity-related challenges 
racial minorities, especially Blacks, often experience when working in predominantly 
White institutions). 
5 See Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J. PHIL. 
5 (1971). 
6 As Sen writes, “[W]e have to draw on the understanding that the force of a bellicose 
identity can be challenged by the power of competing identities. These can, of course, 
include the broad community of our shared humanity, but also many other identities that 
everyone simultaneously has.” SEN, supra note 2, at 4. See also id. at 18–39.  
7 My use of the term “negative identity” differs from Nancy Leong’s, whose definition 
focuses on social marginality, viz., “identity marked by indifference or antipathy to 
something that much of society considers fundamental” such as being “atheist, asexual, 




means in part not to be a member of religion Y. “Who am I?” asks a teenager. 
One possible answer, even if never consciously articulated, is “I am not my 
parents.” The teenager or religious adherent could of course define their 
identities positively, e.g., “I follow religion X because I accept its tenets.” Yet 
for many people, who we are not is critical to our self-definition. We define 
ourselves, in whole or in part, negatively against an anti-self—the person or 
group whom we see ourselves as not being. On occasion, this may be valuable. 
As a step toward individuation, the teenager recognizing that “I am not my 
parents” may be useful. So, too, members of different social groups frequently 
make in-group versus out-group distinctions in the subconscious pursuit of 
safety, a process with neurobiological roots.8 However, as discussed below, as 
a place to dwell permanently, negative identities come with significant risks. 
Having a negative identity is different from simply holding different 
preferences from another person or group. All the time people disagree 
because one wants a certain outcome and the other wants a different outcome. 
One lobbyist hopes that the proposed legislation passes while the other hopes 
that it fails. Two friends disagree about which movie to see because they have 
different tastes. Such situations, however, do not necessarily reflect negative 
identities. While people holding different preferences may have negative 
identities, and while negative identities may lead people to hold different 
preferences, neither is a necessary condition for the other. At root, negative 
identity is not about whether we want different outcomes but rather how one 
constitutes oneself. 
Having a negative identity is also different from simply being 
members of different groups. Yin may be a diehard Yankees fan, and Dara 
may be a diehard Dodgers fan, but that does not mean that they define 
themselves against one another. However, Roger, a diehard Red Sox fan, may 
despise the Yankees so much that being anti-Yankee is a significant part of his 
Red Sox fan identity. Imagine that the Yankees are playing a game against a 
fourth team, say the Cardinals. Dara, the Dodgers fan, may not much care 
 
single, or childfree.” Nancy Leong, Negative Identity, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1357, 1357 
(2015). 
8 See Mina Cikara & Jay J. Van Bavel, The Neuroscience of Intergroup Relations: An 
Integrative Review, 9 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 245, 245–53 (2014) (reviewing 
psychological and neurobiological research concerning in-group versus out-group 
relations). In the past decade, the legal dispute resolution literature has paid increasing 
attention to such findings. See Elizabeth E. Bader, The Psychology and Neurobiology of 
Mediation, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 363 (2016); Richard Birke, Neuroscience and 
Settlement: An Examination of Scientific Innovations and Practical Applications, 25 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 477 (2010); Jeremy Lack & Francois Bogacz, The Neurophysiology 
of ADR and Process Design: A New Approach to Conflict Prevention and Resolution?, 14 
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3 (2012). 




whether the Yankees win or lose, but Roger may take great joy if the Yankees 
lose.9 Simply being members of distinct groups is not the same as holding 
negative identities, though it may sometimes lead to such. Rather defining 
oneself through contrast to another lies at the core of negative identity.  
Frequently there is a backward-looking quality to negative identities.10 
Why do I define myself as “not you”? Often it is because of something that 
has happened in the past, and holding a negative identity helps its holder cling 
to that past. An adult (rather than a teenager) who regularly defines herself as 
“I am not my parents” may be nursing old wounds. A divorced person who 
regularly sees himself as his former spouse’s “ex” may be doing the same. 
Note, too, that negative identities can wax and wane. Initially two parties may 
simply disagree with one another, but if they have enough disagreements for 
a long enough time, and especially if a measure of insult is added, they may 
come to define themselves as adversaries.  
Research suggests that over the past two decades members of both 
major American political parties are increasingly defining themselves in 
negative ways; to be a Democrat means to be opposed to the Republicans and 
vice versa.11 In my view, such polarization goes beyond simply being skeptical 
about what the other side says12 or seeing the world through zero-sum lenses,13 
but is rather about seeing them and us fundamentally as adversaries. I note that 
building a group’s negative identity has repeatedly been used throughout 
history as a winning political formula.14 “Why should you follow me?” asks 
the strongman politician, “because I will protect us from them.” Intergroup 
conflict, of course, makes that message more appealing. Social dislocation can 
be an important factor in this dynamic as well. In times of significant change 
when old roles and identities no longer seem to “work,” people often seek to 
 
9 The taste for another’s suffering, though certainly not necessary for negative identity, 
may well indicate one.  
10 I thank Robin Davis for this insight. 
11 See EZRA KLEIN, WHY WE’RE POLARIZED 8–10, 60–64, 75–79 (2020) (on the rise 
of negative partisanship in America over the past several decades); Alan I. Abramowitz & 
Steven W. Webster, Negative Partisanship: Why Americans Dislike Parties But Behave 
Like Rabid Partisans, 39 ADVANCES IN POL. PSYCHOL. 119, 119–23 (2018); Thomas B. 
Edsall, The Audacity of Hate, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 19, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/19/opinion/trump-anger-fear.html (on the strategic use 
of negative partisanship for political gain). 
12 Such skepticism relates to what social psychologists call “reactive devaluation,” the 
phenomenon of devaluing a proposal made by the opposing side in a conflict because they 
were the ones to suggest it. ARROW ET AL., supra note 4, at 26, 26–42. 
13 See Jonathan R. Cohen, A Genesis of Conflict: The Zero-Sum Mindset, 17 CARDOZO 
J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 427 (2016). 
14 See generally PANJAK MISHRA, THE AGE OF ANGER: A HISTORY OF THE PRESENT 
(2017) (on the rise of nationalistic leaders following periods of social dislocation).  




redefine themselves, and defining themselves negatively against some evil 
“other” can be especially attractive.15  
 
III. SOME PROBLEMS CAUSED BY NEGATIVE IDENTITIES 
 
What is wrong with such negative self-definition? There are many 
problems. Holding a negative identity can be unnecessarily self-constraining. 
Imagine, for example, a man who defines what it means to be a man as “not 
being a woman.” Such a man may suppress important human qualities such as 
compassion, nurturance, and sensitivity because he sees them as “womanly” 
rather than simply human qualities, and thereby lose out on the joys that such 
qualities may help produce.  
Holding a negative identity may increase the odds that one will adopt 
hostile views about and actions toward one’s anti-self. The teen who defines 
himself as “not my parents” may be more likely to fight with his parents. 
Members of group X who define themselves as not being members of group 
Y may become more likely to fight with members of group Y. The backward-
looking focus of certain negative identities may be a piece of this, but there 
are other factors, too. Prejudice and bias are not uncommon features of such 
negative self-definition,16 as are psychological mechanisms such as denial and 
projection (e.g., ascribing to others qualities that one does not wish to face in 
oneself),17 often in the context of shame.18 Ascribing evil motives or even 
nefarious practices to one’s anti-self can even occur. If they are more 
successful than we are, then they must be tricksters and liars. On occasion, 
sentiments of purity and righteousness become linked to negative identities: 
we are the pure and clean while those that we label as the taboo are 
dirt/filth/contamination.19 For example, judges or jurors who either 
 
15 Id.  
16 For example, in many historical eras, movements both religious and non-religious 
have defined themselves in part against a Jewish foil, a practice that has contributed to 
anti-Semitism. See DAVID NIRENBERG, ANTI-JUDAISM: THE WESTERN TRADITION (2014). 
17 On such projection in the context of colonization, see Albert Memmi, Mythical 
Portrait of the Colonized, in ALBERT MEMMI ET AL., THE COLONIZER AND THE COLONIZED, 
79, 79–89 (Beacon Press 1991) (1965).  
18 E-mail from Jennifer Reynolds, Assoc. Professor & Faculty Dir., Univ. of Oregon 
School of Law ADR Center to Jonathan Cohen (Jan. 31, 2020, 18:43 EST) (on file with 
author) (Jennifer Reynolds suggests that in some cases negative identities are produced by 
“shame turned outward,” making such conflicts especially difficult. “If negative identity is 
shame turned outward, then this is another reason why conflicts involving negative identity 
are difficult to resolve—they may ask people to look at themselves more honestly, which 
could be very painful.”). 
19 See generally MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER (2002). 




consciously or subconsciously hold the positive identity of being a law-
abiding citizen may treat criminal defendants differently from those who, 
usually subconsciously, hold a negative identity of not being a criminal, an 
identity that may lead them to want to rid society of criminal filth.20 Again, 
these are not all-or-nothing propositions. Many of us hold both such identities; 
the question is in what measure. 
When conflicts occur, negative identities may make them harder to 
resolve, for, in addition to all of the “usual” problems that arise when parties 
are in conflict,21 sometimes the other party will present ideas and information 
that challenge our sense of self. Rather than listening to such dissonant ideas 
and information, we may consciously or subconsciously choose to ignore it, 
protecting our sense of self at the price of possible resolutions. Anyone, of 
course, can present ideas and information that challenge a person’s sense of 
self, but when a person has a negative identity, the words of the anti-self are 
likely to be especially threatening to one’s identity. Empathy—often a key to 
conflict resolution—is also likely to be particularly difficult in the context of 
negative identity. If I have defined myself as “not you,” then trying to 
understand how the world looks from your perspective is likely to be difficult, 
if not destabilizing to my very sense of self. Put differently, negative identities 
can act as a psychological blind spot, with the anti-self-standing at the center 
of that blind spot.  
 
IV. CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE CONTEXT OF NEGATIVE IDENTITY 
 
What can be done when conflicts arise in the context of negative 
identities? Sometimes conflicts can be handled in a limited way, where 
problems are defined narrowly, and the parties pursue an immediate solution 
to the instant problem rather than attempting a deeper dialogue. Such narrow 
solutions are often quite useful. The parties don’t need to try to see the world 
through the other’s eyes—through the eyes of their anti-self—but can simply 
reach an agreement that would serve them better than would no agreement. 
But is there not more that can be done beyond finding limited, narrow 
solutions at times? Might not deeper levels of conflict resolution and even 
human growth occur in the context of negative identity? And, if so, how is that 
to come about? Let me begin by addressing those questions from the 
perspective of the holder of the negative identity, i.e., how a good-willed 
 
20 On the judges’ tendency to describe criminality in the language of filth, see Martha 
Grace Duncan, In Slime and Darkness: The Metaphor of Filth in Criminal Justice, 68 TUL. 
L. REV. 725 (1993-1994); MARTHA GRACE DUNCAN, ROMANTIC OUTLAWS, BELOVED 
PRISONS: THE UNCONSCIOUS MEANINGS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (1996). 
21 See ARROW, ET AL., supra note 4. 




holder of a negative identity might choose to act. Admittedly, many holders of 
negative identities may not choose to take such steps, but considering this 
idealistic perspective is a valuable intellectual exercise. First, some such 
negative-identity holders may choose to engage in this work of their own 
initiative. Second, this perspective provides food-for-thought about how 
others—most notably third-party neutrals and the anti-self—might engage 
with holders of negative identities, a subject I will then consider.  
For holders of negative identities, a first option is to listen to the other 
party with an open heart and mind, with a willingness to do the hard work of 
thinking deeply about what they say and perhaps be changed by that.22 
Listening does not, of course, automatically imply agreement, but if one has 
no willingness to let one’s thoughts and feelings be changed through dialogue, 
why hold the dialogue? In the context of negative identities, empathetically 
listening to one’s anti-self is especially important. What has their experience 
been? What does the world look like through their eyes? What would it feel 
like to stand in their shoes? Likely one’s anti-self will see the situation, both 
current and historical, through a different set of lenses. Hearing their take on 
things, challenging though that may be, may broaden one’s understanding at a 
deep level.  
A second option is for a party to examine or even interrogate their own 
identity. Why do I define myself this way? Must I define myself this way? It 
is often asserted that we should study the past so that we do not repeat mistakes 
that were made in the past. That is certainly an important reason to examine 
our previous experiences. However, when thinking about negative identity, 
there is another very important reason to study the past: to better understand 
who one is.23 Why do I hold the identities that I do? And if one of those is a 
 
22 See Jonathan R. Cohen, Open-Minded Listening, 5 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 139, 146 
(2014). See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Why We Can’t Just All Get Along: Dysfunction 
in the Polity and Conflict Resolution and What We Might Do About It, 2018 J. DISP. RESOL. 
5, 7–11 (2018) (arguing that much conflict cannot be “reasoned away” by our brains but 
that our hearts must be involved for meaningful change to occur). 
23 In this regard, the approach suggested here differs from much conflict resolution 
analysis that is derived from economic game theory. Neoclassical economic theory 
generally takes parties’ preferences, including their intertemporal preferences, as 
essentially given. See SEN, supra note 2 (As with Sen’s analysis of identity and violence, 
the approach suggested here recognizes that preferences and identities may evolve over 
time, in part from experience, [e.g., bitter, ongoing conflict may produce negative identities 
and preferences associated with them] but also in part through deliberate choice). See 
generally George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 
AMER. ECON. REV. 2, 76 (1977); Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Theory of 
Rational Addiction, 9 J. POL. ECON. 4 (1988); Jonathan R. Cohen, On Reasoned Choice 
36–84 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with the 
Harvard University Library). Put differently, conflict is not simply a matter of strategic, 




negative identity, where did it come from? Is it something I like? Is it 
something that I want to hold on to? As mentioned above, one of the great 
human freedoms is choosing who we want to be. Examining one’s own 
identities is critical to such choice. Further, such self-examination can be 
essential for conflict resolution. If I can understand how I came to define 
myself as “not you,” I may then be able to define myself in a new, positive 
way. If I can do that, resolving our conflicts may become much easier. 
A third option for the holder of the negative identity may be to accept 
that, yes, I do hold a negative identity vis-à-vis my anti-self, but also recognize 
that both of us hold multiple identities. Might it be possible for us to focus on 
what we have in common rather than what drives us apart? “I’m a member of 
group X and you’re a member of group Y, and as members of these groups we 
disagree deeply about certain things. But I am not only a member of group X 
and you are not only a member of group Y. Perhaps if we can look at what we 
have in common we can work out some of our differences.”  
Are there steps that others, most notably third-party neutrals and the 
anti-self, can take to promote conflict resolution in the context of negative 
identity? The brief answer (for exploring this topic at length is beyond my 
scope here) is “yes.” Many already do so to some degree. Most mediations 
begin by allowing each party to share its version of the dispute with the other 
party. Where parties hold negative identities, this can be especially valuable, 
for hearing the other party’s experiences and perspective can lead one to 
rethink many things. Indeed, one school of mediation takes as its central goal 
promoting the parties’ understanding of their dispute,24 an inquiry that 
conceivably may reach into probing the parties’ identities.25 What identity(ies) 
do you hold and where did they come from? Consider Carrie Menkel-
 
intertemporal interaction, it is also a process through which the parties themselves are 
constructed—and may choose aspects of their own construction. Critical to this process of 
identity construction are the stories we tell ourselves. See SARA COBB, SPEAKING OF 
VIOLENCE: THE POLITICS AND POETICS OF NARRATIVE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION 15 (2013) 
(“Although the interest-based discourse has certainly contributed to conflict resolution, it 
has fit, hand-in-glove, to the discourse of rational choice theory, which disattends to the 
presence and creations of meaning systems and their relation to violence.”). 
24 See, e.g., GARY FRIEDMAN & JACK HIMMELSTEIN, CHALLENGING CONFLICT: 
MEDIATION THROUGH UNDERSTANDING (2009). 
25 I think of the increasing role of Internal Family Systems psychological theory (viz., 
exploring different parts of a person’s psyche and engaging in dialogue with such parts) in 
mediation. See David A. Hoffman, Mediation, Multiple Minds, and Managing the 
Negotiation Within, 16 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 297 (2011); Leonard L. Riskin, Managing 
Inner and Outer Conflict: Selves, Subpersonalities, and Internal Family Systems, 18 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2013). 




Meadow’s description of many successful dialogue processes designed to 
foster intergroup conflict resolution: 
 
No matter how large disputing groups may be 
(though small is almost always better here) 
beginning with personal statements of who a 
person is, what the sources of their identity 
and beliefs are, what major experiences have 
molded them (in their own views) and what 
concerns or “curiosities” or questions they 
have about their own views, often opens up 
the often hidden assumptions or rigid 
backgrounds of particular views for further 
exploration. 26 
 
When third-party neutrals foster conversations that help parties see one 
another as full people (e.g., people who also have fears, stresses, and 
vulnerabilities), dialogue can become much easier.27 In areas of group conflict, 
good historical education, too, can play an extremely valuable part, helping 
each side understand not only its own history but its counterpart’s history. I 
emphasize “good” for, especially in the context of group conflict, all too often 
history is taught in a limited way (e.g., teaching only the history that valorizes 
our side) rather than in a rich and critical way.  
When one party holds a negative identity, are there things the anti-self 
can do to help promote conflict resolution between them? Briefly, the answer 
here is “yes” as well, though the task is not simple. In some conflicts, a direct 
approach of asking questions such as “How did you come to feel this way?” 
“Why do you see me the way that you do?” or even “How do you understand 
the past and how it has brought us here?” may be possible. In other conflicts, 
an indirect approach may yield better results. For example, one may try to act 
in ways that create cognitive dissonance in the mind of the party who holds a 
negative identity. Recall the historic, non-violent civil rights protests led by 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Many Whites defined themselves (and 
unfortunately still define themselves) as not Black, including stereotyping 
Blacks, especially Black men, as criminal and violent.28 A piece of the 
brilliance of the non-violent protests was that those protests called attention to 
 
26 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 23, at 16. 
27 Id. at 16–17. 
28 See, e.g., Katheryn K. Russell, The Racial Hoax as Crime: The Law as Affirmation, 
71 IND. L.J. 593 (1996) (critiquing the prejudicial but influential myth of the 
“criminalblackman”); KATHERYN RUSSELL-BROWN, THE COLOR OF CRIME (2008).  




the racism of segregation in a way that created a cognitive dissonance for 
Whites: it was the Black protesters who were peaceful and the White police 
and mobs who were violent. Such dissonance, in my view, was an aspect of 
why these protests gained wide media coverage.  
 
V. A LITERARY EXAMPLE – JACOB AND ESAU 
  
Sometimes a story can bring abstract ideas to life. When it comes to 
interplay between negative identity and conflict, I know of no literary example 
illustrating this interplay better than the biblical saga of Jacob and Esau.29 
According to the Bible, Jacob and Esau were twins born of their parents Isaac 
and Rebekah. Even in utero, the brothers struggled against each other, 
apparently causing Rebekah significant discomfort:  
 
[T]he children struggled in her womb, and 
she [Rebekah] said, “If so, why do I exist?” 
She went to inquire of the Lord, and the Lord 
answered her, “Two nations are in your 
womb, two separate peoples shall issue from 
your body; one people shall be mightier than 
the other, and the older shall serve the 
younger.”30 
 
Jacob’s name itself reflects this strife. The Hebrew word for Jacob, Ya’akov, 
is a variant of the word ekev, meaning heel. Why is Jacob called Ya’akov? The 
Bible explains that Jacob is so named because he emerged from Rebekah’s 
womb grasping his older brother Esau’s heel.31 Names and identity go hand in 
 
29 I write “literary example” for the historicity of these early Biblical narratives is a 
subject of much dispute, due in part to the absence of archeological evidence confirming 
such narratives. See ISRAEL FINKELSTEIN & NEAL SILBERMAN, THE BIBLE UNEARTHED 35 
(2001); THOMAS L. THOMPSON, THE HISTORICITY OF THE PATRIARCHAL NARRATIVES: THE 
QUEST FOR THE HISTORICAL ABRAHAM 2–3 (1974); THOMAS L. THOMPSON, BIBLICAL 
NARRATIVE AND PALESTINE’S HISTORY: CHANGING PERSPECTIVES 2, 55 (2013) (“The 
current standard interpretation of the conflict themes in the Jacob narratives understands 
the stories as more or less historiographic traditions that reflect real historical or 
sociological conflicts between ancient Israel and neighboring or related groups of 
people[.]”).  
30 Genesis 25:22–23. All biblical verses come from the Jewish Publication Society’s 
1985 translation. 
31 Genesis at 25:26. 




hand, especially in the Bible,32 and from his very birth Jacob is defined in 
contrast to his brother. 
This contrast between the twins continues to be a theme as they grow, 
each serving as a foil to the other. Esau is defined as a “skillful hunter, a man 
of the outdoors; but Jacob was a mild man who stayed in camp.” 33 Their father 
Isaac prefers Esau while their mother Rebekah favors Jacob.34 As one might 
expect, conflict becomes a defining theme of the brothers’ lives. First, there is 
the stew story in which Jacob extracts from a famished Esau his firstborn 
birthright in exchange for a bowl of red pottage.35 Next comes the story from 
the deathbed of their blind, elderly father Isaac,36 where at Rebekah’s behest 
Jacob masquerades as Esau, donning Esau’s clothes and covering his hands 
and neck in goat skins to feel like the hairy Esau.37 Further, when Isaac asks 
Jacob which of his sons he is, Jacob answers, “I am Esau, your first-born,”38 
so as to receive from Isaac Esau’s firstborn blessing.39 Isaac bestows upon 
Jacob that firstborn blessing and immediately thereafter, Esau arrives, Jacob 
now departed. 40 Upon discovering that Isaac has bestowed the firstborn 
blessing upon Jacob, Esau bursts into wild and bitter sobbing and pleads with 
their father to bless him as well (“Have you but one blessing, Father? Bless 
me too, Father!”).41 The response he receives is as much a curse as a blessing.42 
Esau becomes enraged and vows to kill Jacob once the days of mourning for 
 
32 Names signifying certain meanings or identities are common in the Bible, and this 
is especially clear in the Hebrew. See, e.g., Genesis 2:7 (the first person, Adam, is created 
out of the dust of the Earth [Adamah]); Genesis 2:10 (Moses [Moshe] is so named because 
Pharoah’s daughter drew him out of the water, M’shiteihu). This is like calling the first-
person Adam “Earthling” and Moses “From Water Drawn.” By rough analogy, one might 
think of the names of modern-day superheroes like “Spiderman” (who is part spider and 
part person), “Superman” (who possesses superpowers), or “Flash” (who moves in a flash); 
their names deeply signify their characters. Additionally, as with Jacob’s being renamed 
“Israel,” name changes in the Bible carry much meaning. See, e.g., Genesis 17:4–5 (on 
Abram’s renaming to “Abraham”); Genesis 17:15–16 (on Sarai’s renaming to “Sarah”). 
33 Genesis 25:27. 
34 Genesis 25:28. 
35 Genesis 25:29–35. 
36 Genesis 26:34 (Jacob and Esau are now at least forty). 
37 Genesis 27:16. 
38 Genesis 27:19.  
39 Genesis 27:18–19. 
40 Genesis 27:28–29. 
41 Genesis 27:34–38. 
42 Genesis 27:39–40 (“See, your abode shall enjoy the fat of the earth and the dew of 
heaven above. Yet by your sword you shall live, and you shall serve your brother; but when 
you grow restive, you shall break his yoke from your neck.”). 




their father Isaac have ended.43 Fearing imminent fratricide, Rebekah advises 
Jacob to flee, which he does.44 
The two brothers will not meet again until some twenty years later, 
years during which Jacob, once the deceiver, now becomes the deceived.45 
What will happen when they meet? As biblical readers may recall, the brothers 
reconcile,46 but it is what takes place on the eve of their reconciliation that is 
most suggestive concerning the value of moving beyond negative identity for 
conflict resolution. 
The setting for their re-encounter is the land of Seir where Esau 
dwells. As Jacob and his large entourage approach that land, he first sends 
messengers to announce his peaceful intentions.47 The messengers return, 
announcing that Esau is approaching with four hundred men.48 Fearing a 
violent encounter, Jacob divides his followers into two camps—if Esau attacks 
one camp, at least the other may escape.49 That evening—the evening before 
Jacob will meet Esau again—we are told of a strange incident: 
 
[That night] Jacob was left alone. And a man 
wrestled with him until the break of dawn. 
When he saw that he had not prevailed 
against him, he wrenched Jacob’s hip at its 
socket, so that the socket of his hip was 
strained as he wrestled with him. Then he 
said, “Let me go, for dawn is breaking.” But 
 
43 Genesis 27:41. 
44 Genesis 27:42–44. 
45 Genesis 29:14–28. I refer to Jacob’s marriages to sisters Rachel and Leah. Id. Jacob 
loved Rachel and worked for her father Laban for seven years believing his reward would 
be marrying Rachel. Id. Yet Laban tricks Jacob into marrying the older sister Leah. Id. 
Jacob is then permitted to marry Rachel one week later, but only if he toils in Laban’s 
service for another seven years, which he does. Id. Perhaps in this what-goes-around-
comes-around story (Jacob, who once deceived his father Isaac, now becomes deceived by 
his father-in-law Laban), there is a hint concerning the maturation of Jacob’s identity. 
Might experiencing the pain of having been deceived taught Jacob empathy for his brother 
Esau, causing Jacob to rethink his own past actions? As with much of the Bible, the text is 
sparse and the reader can only speculate, but this story too is suggestive of Jacob 
reexamining his own life, including his own identity. 
46 Genesis 33:4 (“And Esau ran to meet him [Jacob], and embraced him, and fell on 
his neck, and kissed him; and they wept.”). I note, however, that the Bible describes later 
hostility between the Amalekites (descendants of Esau) and the Israelites (descendants of 
Jacob). See, e.g., Exodus 17:8–16. 
47 Genesis 32:4–6. 
48 Genesis 32:7. 
49 Genesis 32:8. 




he answered, “I will not let you go, unless 
you bless me.” Said the other, “What is your 
name?” He replied, “Jacob.” Said he, “Your 
name shall no longer be Jacob, but Israel, for 
you have striven with beings divine and 
human, and have prevailed.”50 
 
For generations, biblical commentators have wrestled with the question of 
exactly who or what this mysterious figure was who wrestled with Jacob, in 
part due to the ambiguity of the final sentence above: “Your name shall no 
longer be Jacob, but Israel, for you have striven with beings divine and human, 
and have prevailed.”51 Was this mysterious being a person? Might he have 
been an angel or perhaps even God? The great 11th century French 
commentator Rashi saw this mysterious being as Esau’s guardian angel.52 In a 
similar vein, contemporary Jungian psychologist Esther Spitzer views him as 
Jacob’s own psychological shadow, the parts of his own personality that he 
would rather not face.53 Whatever the exact nature of this mysterious wrestler, 
most noteworthy is the act and timing of the renaming. It is on the eve of 
Jacob’s reconciliation with his lifelong rival, his anti-self Esau, that Jacob 
receives the new name, and hence new identity, of “Israel.”  
The Jacob and Esau narrative is suggestive of several ideas concerning 
the interaction between negative identity and conflict. First and most basically, 
negative identity may help to produce conflict. The characters Jacob and Esau 
are essentially anti-selves to one another, and so long as they hold these 
negative identities, conflict is the dominant theme of their relationship. 
Second, the internal work of moving beyond a negative identity may 
be essential to conflict resolution. Once a party can see itself as more than “not 
them,” working out differences with “them” may become easier. Jacob’s 
reconciliation with his lifelong rival Esau occurs the day after he goes from 
being Jacob-the-heel-grabber to Israel-the-God-wrestler. Conflict resolution 
professionals frequently strive to create safe spaces for dialogue between the 
parties, such as mediation. Where a party holds a negative identity, finding a 
safe space for that party’s internal exploration of their negative identity may 
also be essential. As Jennifer Reynolds writes, “[When people hold strong 
 
50 Genesis 32:25–30. 
51 Genesis 32:25–30.  
52 See ABRAHAM BEN ISAIAH & BENJAMIN SHARFMAN, THE PENTATEUCH AND RASHI’S 
COMMENTARY: A LINEAR TRANSLATION INTO ENGLISH: GENESIS 330 (1976).  
53 Esther Spitzer, A Jungian Midrash on Jacob’s Dream, in THE RECONSTRUCTIONIST 
22–23 (1976), as quoted in THE TORAH: A MODERN COMMENTARY 223 (W. Gunther Plaut 
ed., 1981). 




negative identities, it] may be that creating spaces in which people with 
different views can talk is less important than creating spaces [for] someone 
to explore what his/her/their negative identity is all about.”54  
 Third, seeking to resolve conflict with one’s anti-self can serve as a 
catalyst for reworking one’s identity when that identity is, in part, a negative 
one. Why is it difficult to meet with people with whom we are in conflict? Part 
of the reason is that such encounters often “stir up stuff” within ourselves. At 
times, such encounters may force us to face aspects of our negative identity 
that we usually do not face.55 Put differently, the interaction between negative 
identity and conflict resolution may be bi-directional: facing one’s negative 
identity may aid in resolving conflict with one’s anti-self, and engaging in 





Identity is a core piece of the human experience. All too often, conflict 
is a piece of the human experience, too. Here, I have suggested that a particular 
form of identity—negative identity—may make conflicts more likely to arise 
and also make them more difficult to resolve when they do. Fortunately, all is 
not lost. For example, through open-minded listening, self-examination, and 
embracing different aspects of our identities we may be better able to resolve 
conflicts. Third party neutrals and the other party to the conflict (i.e., the anti-
self) can also take steps to promote conflict resolution in the context of 
negative identity, steps that may lead parties to rethink their very sense of self. 
Such steps may not be easy, but they are possible. When they succeed, conflict 
resolution becomes not only a process for resolving disputes, but also a means 





54 Reynolds, supra note 19.  
55 Note that Jacob’s reencounter with Esau appears not to be a matter of choice, but 
necessity, for tension between Jacob and his father-in-law Laban has led Jacob to depart 
Laban’s home. Genesis 25:22–23.  
